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THE TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997 AND HOMEOWNERSHIP:
IS SMALLER NOW BETTER?
AMELIA M. BIEHL and WILLIAM H. HOYT∗
Prior to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), the capital gain from the sale of
a home was taxed differently for those over and under the age of 55. TRA97 eliminated
this differential treatment. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that home
sellers slightly under the age of 55 were 6.2% more likely to move for a less expensive
house to maintain, 6.6% less likely to move for a larger place, and 5.2% more likely to
reside in a condominium after TRA97’s enactment, relative to those slightly over 55.
(JEL H24, R21)
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is a lengthy literature on the
U.S. Tax Code’s mortgage interest deduction
and property tax deduction, less attention has
been paid to the capital gains tax treatment
of owner-occupied housing. Prior to 1997, the
U.S. Federal Income Tax Code allowed home
sellers to roll over capital gains taxes from the
sale of a home if they bought up—that is, if
they purchased another house within 2 years
that was at least as expensive as their previous
home. In 1996, the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget (OMBA) estimated tax expenditures
of $14.4 billion from this deferral (rollover) of
capital gain taxation. Home sellers over the age
of 55 were treated differently than those under
55 as they received a one-time capital gains tax
exclusion from the sale of an owner-occupied
home of up to $125,000, a tax expenditure of
$5.2 billion.1 To give some perspective, the tax
expenditure associated with the deductibility of
state and local property taxes was estimated to
be $15.9 billion, and the expenditure from the
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deductibility of mortgage interest payments was
$47.5 billion in 1996.1
The passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997 (TRA97) eliminated the differential
treatment of home sellers over and under the age
of 55. After 1997, the first $250,000 ($500,000)
in capital gains from the sale of a single
(married) owner-occupier’s primary residence
is tax exempt, regardless of the home seller’s
age and whether they purchase more or less
housing following the sale of their residence. For
most home sellers, this effectively eliminates
capital gains taxation from the sale of a primary
residence, as the median home price was less
than the exclusion amount.2 In addition, TRA97
lowered the marginal tax rate applied to long-
term capital gains from any assets, including
housing.
Incentives created by the Federal Tax Code
prior to 1997 for home sellers under the age
of 55 to purchase a more expensive house than
their previous one, or “buy up,” to defer capital
gains taxes have been of particular interest to
economists. If, instead, a home seller bought a
less expensive home, or “bought down,” and had
a capital gain, taxes were paid on the difference
2. Homeowners had to make the residence their primary
home for 2 of the past 5 years to qualify for the exemption.
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between the values of the two homes up to the
maximum of the capital gain. Thus, for home
sellers, incentives to buy more expensive homes
were created.
In addition to the incentive to buy up, the
differential tax treatment of home sellers under
55 from those older than 55 may lead to a
lock-in effect—the incentive for a homeowner
under 55 to defer selling her home if she
desires a less expensive one, consistent with
Shan (2011). This creates “mismatch” in the
housing market as homeowners choose to reside
in homes that no longer reflect their housing
demand in an effort to avoid taxation of capital
gains. This being the case, the post-TRA97
taxation of capital gains is expected to increase
the likelihood that a homeowner younger than
55 moves to less expensive housing.
While it is true that home sellers over the age
of 55 were affected by TRA97, as it increased
the level of capital gains exempt from taxation
and lowered capital gains tax rates, we do not
expect the impact of these changes to lead to as
significant behavioral changes for home sellers
older than 55 as the behavioral changes for
those under 55.3 Exploiting the fact that TRA97
differentially affects those over and under 55
allows identification of some of the effects it
has had on the housing market. Specifically,
this allows us to see if home sellers under the
age of 55 who are no longer locked-in to their
current level of housing consumption bought
less expensive housing, or “moved down” after
1997, reducing mismatch. Rather than focusing
on all home sellers under the age of 55 to
provide better comparison with home sellers
over the age of 55, we focus on home sellers
between the age of 50 and 54 and compare
with home sellers between the ages of 56 and
60. As our difference-in-difference methodology
uses home sellers between the ages of 56
and 60 as a comparison group, our results
should be interpreted as the change in housing
decisions after the enactment of TRA97 for our
treatment group of 50- to 54-year-old home
sellers relative to our control group, the 56- to
60-year-old home sellers. If, in fact, both groups
3. As discussed in more detail later, prior to TRA97
homeowners over 55 had a one-time exemption of $125,000
in capital gains. After TRA97 the exemption increased to
$250,000 for all homeowners. As suggested by a referee, the
lower exemption prior to 1997 might have reduced mobility
for those over 55 who might have desired to gradually
reduce housing consumption over the course of several
moves.
reduce housing consumption after TRA97, our
estimates might be considered a lower bound of
TRA97’s true impact.4
We find evidence that our sample of house-
holds under the age of 55 are less likely to
be locked-in to “mismatched” housing after
TRA97, and that they are more likely to move
down, relative to our comparison group of home
sellers over 55. Specifically, home sellers under
55 are 6.2% more likely to move to a resi-
dence that is less expensive to maintain after
1997, relative to home sellers over 55. We also
find that home sellers between the ages of 50
and 54 are about 7% less likely to move for
a larger house following TRA97’s enactment,
relative to home sellers over 55. In addition,
home sellers affected by TRA97 are about 5%
more likely to live in a condominium after
TRA97 than home sellers between the ages of
56 and 60. All of these estimates are consistent
with the idea that some homeowners were mis-
matched prior to 1997, and these homeowners
moved to a residence that more closely matched
their current levels housing demand, making the
owner-occupied housing market more alloca-
tively efficient.
In Section II, we review the literature on cap-
ital gains and housing. We discuss the effects
of capital gains taxation on housing consump-
tion in Section III. In Section IV, we discuss
our data and empirical model. The results of our
estimation are found in Section V, followed by
falsification tests in Section VI. Our last section
offers some concluding remarks.
II. THE LITERATURE ON CAPITAL GAINS
AND HOUSING
The few studies that have examined the taxa-
tion of capital gains and housing suggest that it
has significant impacts on the housing market.
Studies by Burman, Wallace, and Weiner (1996)
and Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990, 1992) examine
the impact of pre-TRA97 capital gains taxation
on housing consumption. Using administrative
data Burman, Wallace, and Weiner (1996) esti-
mate that annually as many as 200,000 home
sellers under 55 purchased more expensive
homes than they would have without this spe-
cial tax treatment. Hoyt and Rosenthal (1992),
using estimates of a housing demand function
obtained with nonlinear budget techniques from
4. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this
possibility to our attention.
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Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990) and data from the
American Housing Survey (AHS), predict that
housing demand would fall by 16% if realized
capital gains from moving down were not taxed,
further illustrating the distortionary effect of the
capital gains tax code. Newman and Reschovsky
(1987) and Sinai (1998) use the Panel of
Income Dynamics to examine the impacts of
changes in the level of exemptions in the late
1970s and early 1980s on household mobil-
ity. Both of these studies found that the dif-
ferential capital gains taxation appears to have
a lock-in effect, that is, it reduces household
mobility.
In contrast to these studies, all of which use
data prior to 1997, we use data from both before
and after the enactment of TRA97 to examine
its impact on household mobility and housing
consumption. Only four other studies of which
we are aware, Bier, Maric, and Weizer (2000),
Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008), Farnham
(2006), and Shan (2011) examine this law using
data following the TRA97’s enactment.
Bier, Maric, and Weizer (2000) examine
whether TRA97 affects a household’s decision
to buy a more or less expensive home during
the 17 months following its enactment. Using
public records of deed transfers from four Ohio
cities, they find statistically significant results
only for one city (Columbus), where more
homeowners moved down in the 17 months fol-
lowing TRA97 than had prior to 1997. However,
the impacts of TRA97 are based on whether
or not the household moved before or after the
passage of TRA97, as demographic variables,
including age, are not available.
Shan (2011) also uses transaction data to
uncover the effects of TRA97, focusing on
single-family home sales in affluent towns in
the Boston metropolitan area. Specifically, she
imputes accumulated capital gains for each res-
idence and finds that sales rates of houses with
gains between zero and $500,000 increased after
TRA97, indicating that tax law prior to TRA97
created a lock-in effect in the towns that she
examined.
Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008) use the
1997 and 1999 Current Population Survey
(CPS) to estimate the effect of TRA97 on
the decision to move. As TRA97 differen-
tially affects homeowners under and over the
age of 55, they use a difference-in-difference
approach comparing homeowners aged 52–54
with those 56–58 years of age before and after
the passage of TRA97. Estimating a linear
probability model, they find that homeowners
affected by TRA97 are 22%–31% more likely
to move than their counterparts above 55, with
most of this effect coming from highly mobile
subgroups that were expected to want to move
down a priori.
Farnham (2006) exploits the fact that the
AHS is a survey of housing units to determine
the capital gain from the sale of a house by
comparing the value at different times in the
survey, an approach similar to Shan (2011). He,
like Shan (2011), then estimates a hazard model
of the probability of moving accounting for the
estimated capital gain. He also finds, in fact, that
those with higher capital gains and gains subject
to taxation are less mobile.
Our study complements the work of these
post-TRA97 studies. Unlike Cunningham and
Engelhardt (2008), Shan (2011), and Farnham
(2006) who focus on the “lock-in” effect of cap-
ital gains taxation prior to TRA97 on mobility,
we focus on another lock-in created by capital
taxation—the impact on housing consumption.
Like Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008), we
exploit the difference in treatment of those under
and over the age of 55 before TRA97 to do a
difference-in-difference analysis. Our source of
data, AHS, provides both detailed information
on individual home seller characteristics and
housing characteristics of the home sellers new
residence. While Farnham (2006) uses these data
as well he also focuses on the impact of TRA97
on household mobility and not on housing con-
sumption. Unlike Cunningham and Engelhardt
(2008) and Shan (2011), we know both the rea-
sons that a home seller moved as well as the type
of housing into which the home seller moved.
Then, given a respondent sold her home, we can
determine whether TRA97 did, in fact, have an
impact on the nature of the housing into which
she moved.
The information from the AHS on housing
characteristics, including whether a home seller
moved to a condominium, enables us to address
the issue examined earlier by Hoyt and Rosen-
thal (1990, 1992) and Burman, Wallace, and
Weiner (1996)—how changes in capital gains
taxation affected the consumption of housing.
III. THE IMPACTS OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
ON HOUSING MARKETS
After TRA97, with a few exceptions, home
sellers do not pay capital gains taxes on the sale
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FIGURE 1
Budget Constraint for Home Sellers Under
Age 55 Prior to 1997
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of their home.5 Prior to 1997, capital gains taxes
are due if a home seller under 55 purchases a
less expensive home (moves down). Then, prior
to 1997, home sellers under the age of 55 who
buy a new house pay capital gains taxes in the
amount of
T = min[tG, t (V o − H ′R)](1)
where T is total capital gains taxes paid, t is the
marginal income tax rate facing a home seller,
G is the capital gains from the sale of the home,
V o is the sale price of the home, H ′ is the stock
of housing in the replacement home, and R is
the rental cost of owner-occupied housing, as
defined by Rosen (1979).
Because the capital gains taxes paid on the
sale of a previous home depend on a household’s
current choice of housing, homeowners face dif-
ferent prices of housing depending on the quan-
tity of their new housing consumption, relative
to their previous consumption. This is illustrated
in Figure 1, where X represents all other goods,
Y is income, P is the price of housing, and r is
the household’s discount rate. Segment 1 illus-
trates the budget constraint for a home seller
who buys a more expensive home and faces
the price R. Segment 2 corresponds to a home
seller who moves down but considers a house of
value such that they do not pay tax on the full
5. Homeowners are still required to pay capital gains
taxes on homes that are not their primary residence and
homes that they have not lived in for 2 of the last 5 years. In
cases where their realized gain is larger than their exclusion
amount they owe taxes on the difference.
capital gain (V o − H ′R < G). This being the
case, increases in housing consumption reduce
the amount paid in capital gains taxes, mak-
ing the effective price of housing R(1– t) on
this section of the budget constraint. Finally, for
the home seller whose capital gain exceeds the
difference between the value of their previous
home and their current, less expensive home,
small changes in housing do not change the cap-
ital gains taxes paid, making the price R. This
case is represented by Segment 3 in the figure.
Some home sellers who, prior to 1997, pur-
chased a home of approximately equal value to
their previous home may have chosen to buy
a less expensive home in the absence of cap-
ital gains taxation. These households are mis-
matched, as they are consuming housing that
does not reflect their true housing demand.
An example of this phenomenon is found in
Figure 2, which contains both the pre-1997 and
post-1997 budget constraints for a household
under 55 with a capital gain from the sale of
a home. While this household is located at the
“kink” under the pre-1997 budget constraint,
that is, the value of its current and previous
houses are the same, under the post-1997 linear
budget constraint the household will clearly pur-
chase less housing. Therefore, the mismatch cre-
ated by the pre-TRA97 tax code no longer exists.
IV. DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
A. Data
Data for our analysis comes from the AHS,
a survey of housing structures that contains
FIGURE 2
Budget Constraint Before and After TRA97:
Home Sellers at the Kink Move Down After
1997












detailed housing characteristics, demographic
information for occupants and, of particular
interest, information about occupants’ recent
moves. We use metropolitan surveys from both
before and after 1997 including 1995, 1996,
1998, 2002, and 2004. In each of these five
surveys, between 6 and 15 metropolitan areas
were surveyed annually, with at least 3,200
housing units from each area. In addition, we
supplement these data with data from the 1995,
1999, and 2003 AHS national survey.6 We focus
on recent movers who owned their previous
home (home sellers), as previous tenure status
is only asked of respondents who moved in the
past 24 months. In an effort to ensure that our
treatment group and comparison group do not
have significantly different trends in housing
demand, we also restrict the sample to those
between 50 and 60 years of age. Similar to
Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008), the age
restrictions included in our analysis refer to the
age of the oldest respondent in the household
(either the household head or the spouse of the
household head), and we exclude home sellers
who are exactly 55. Therefore, our treatment
group includes home sellers between the ages of
50 and 54, and our comparison group is made
up of home sellers between 56 and 60. While we
use this narrow age band around 55 for purposes
of trying to minimize differences in housing
consumption trends between the comparison
groups, as we discuss more later, TRA97 might
have different impacts on the housing decisions
of those much younger than 55.
Unfortunately, unlike earlier waves of the
AHS, recent waves do not report the value of the
household’s previous home. Thus, unlike Hoyt
and Rosenthal (1990, 1992), we cannot directly
determine if homeowners actually bought a less
expensive home. However, since the pre-TRA97
tax code locked homeowners with large capi-
tal gains into their existing residences, it also
created mismatch. Therefore, we exploit a num-
ber of the questions asked in the AHS to
address the issue of housing mismatch, specif-
ically examining the extent to which previous
homeowners moved down, to smaller homes,
after 1997.
One measure of whether a home seller moved
down is her response to a question regarding the
6. We use national samples from the 1995, 1999, and
2003 survey years only, as these samples are supplemented
with extra observations from large cities. National samples
from other survey years near TRA97 (1997 and 2001) do
not contain geographic identifiers for most observations.
reasons why she moved. One of their choices
is a desire for a “less expensive house to
maintain.” While we concede that a desire
for a “less expensive house to maintain” may
not necessarily mean they are living in a less
expensive home, we believe this response is a
good indication that the respondent moved to a
residence that more closely matches her housing
demand, eliminating mismatch created by the
pre-TRA97 tax code.
Another possible reason for moving is to
move to a larger house or apartment. After
TRA97, home sellers between the ages of 50
and 54 are expected to be more likely to move
to a smaller place and therefore less likely to
move for a larger residence, relative to those
over age 55, again reducing mismatch.
We also explore changes in the probability of
a home seller moving to a condominium. Com-
pared with living in a single family home, living
in a condominium involves less maintenance. In
addition, in this sample, the average price of a
condominium is less than that of other owner-
occupied housing, with the average size of a
condominium being smaller. Therefore, moving
to this distinct type of housing represents both
moving down and reducing mismatch, and we
expect home sellers under the age of 55 to be
more likely to own a condominium after TRA97,
relative to those over age 55.
While, individually, none of these mea-
sures is perfectly correlated with moving down,
together, they represent the first evidence of the
impacts of TRA97 on changes in the desire to
live in a home that is less expensive to main-
tain, (not) live in a larger home, and purchase
a condominium, and provide a good measure of
how TRA97 affected mismatch.
The variable TRA97 is designed to capture
the effects of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. It
is an indicator variable equal to one if the oldest
respondent (either the head of the household
or the head of the household’s spouse) was
under age 55 when the household moved and
the household moved after TRA97 was enacted,
specifically after August 1997.7 Again, relative
to home sellers over 55, we expect home sellers
under the age of 55 to be more likely to move
down and less likely to be mismatched after
7. TRA97 was signed into law on August 5, 1997. It
applied retroactively to home sales on or after May 6, 1997.
However, we assume that respondents who moved in May
1997 were not influenced by the law, which had not been
passed.
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1997, as they no longer have a tax incentive
to move up.
In constructing TRA97, home sellers over
the age of 55, those that may have moved
down without penalty prior to 1997, are the
comparison group. Although this tax legislation
did, in fact, create a “natural experiment,” as
home sellers under and over the age of 55 went
from being treated differently by the tax code to
the same, TRA97 also changed the tax treatment
of capital gains from the sale of a home for home
sellers over the age of 55 as well. The exemption
amount for all home sellers is $250,000 or
$500,000 depending on their marital status, an
increase from $125,000 for home sellers over
the age of 55, with the exemption no longer
limited to once in a lifetime. In addition, TRA97
eliminated the deferral of taxes with all gains on
sales above the exclusion taxed in the year they
are sold. Finally, TRA97 lowered the long-term
capital gains tax rates from ranges of 15%–28%
to ranges of 10%–20%. While it is not the case
that those over the age of 55 were unaffected
by TRA97, as their housing decisions may be
influenced by it, it is certainly the case that
TRA97 has a differential impact on homeowners
over and under the age of 55. Thus, as discussed
earlier, our results are best interpreted as the
impacts of TRA97 on the behavior of home
sellers between the ages of 50 and 54 relative
to those between the ages of 56 and 60.
B. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
As discussed, the sample consists entirely of
home sellers who sold their previous residence
and moved in the 24 months prior to being
interviewed. In the table, summary statistics are
given for four distinct groups: those between
the ages of 50 and 54 who moved before
TRA97 was passed; those between the ages
of 50 and 54 who moved after TRA97 was
passed; those between the ages of 56 and 60 who
moved before TRA97 was passed; and those
over the age of 55 who moved after TRA97 was
passed. Reporting summary statistics for these
four groups is consistent with the difference-in-
difference estimation methodology we employ
to evaluate the impacts of TRA97 on housing
decisions.
Table 1 also reports difference-in-difference
results based on the summary statistics. As can
be seen in Table 1, only 4.4% of respondents
under the age of 55 who moved prior to the
passage of TRA97 said they moved for a “less
expensive house to maintain,” while 8.1% of
this age group who moved after TRA97 moved
for this reason, which represents a statistically
significant difference (column (c)). In contrast,
when we examine the sample between the ages
of 56 and 60, there is virtually no change
in percentage of respondents giving this as a
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics











(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Mean Mean (b)–(a) Mean Mean (e)–(d) (c)–(f)
Reported moving for a
less expensive home
0.044 0.081 0.037∗∗ 0.084 0.080 −0.004 0.041∗
Reported moving for a
larger place
0.146 0.118 −0.028 0.058 0.095 0.037∗∗ −0.065∗∗
Moved to a condominium 0.070 0.100 0.030∗ 0.132 0.112 −0.020 0.050∗
White 0.867 0.827 −0.040∗ 0.890 0.848 −0.042∗ −0.002
Female 0.370 0.457 0.087∗∗∗ 0.396 0.457 0.061∗∗ −0.026
Married 0.619 0.572 −0.047 0.595 0.615 0.020 −0.067
Number of children 0.414 0.411 −0.003 0.151 0.124 −0.027 0.024
High school diploma 0.919 0.922 0.003 0.868 0.900 0.032 −0.029
Bachelor’s degree 0.394 0.419 0.025 0.300 0.368 0.068∗∗ −0.043
Family income/150,000
($2004)
0.353 0.442 0.089∗∗∗ 0.322 0.413 0.091∗∗∗ −0.002
Observations 459 781 417 652
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
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reason for moving before and after TRA97. As
shown in column (g), the difference in difference
between the two groups (column (c)–column
(f)) is statistically significant—consistent with
the idea that TRA97 had a differential impact
on our group of home sellers under the age of
55. The percentage of respondents under 55 who
list “moving for a larger place” as a reason for
moving is not significantly different before and
after TRA97 (column (c)). However, there is a
statistically significant 3.7% increase in the per-
centage of respondents between the ages of 56
and 60 who list this as a reason for moving after
TRA97 (column (f)). Again, the difference in
difference between the two age groups is statis-
tically significant (column (g)), suggesting that
home sellers under 55 are 6.5% less likely to
move for a larger place after TRA97 than those
over 55. Finally, for our last measure of hous-
ing consumption, moving to a condominium,
respondents under 55 are 3.0% more likely to
move to a condominium after TRA97 (column
(c)), while there was no statistical difference in
the likelihood of moving to a condominium for
respondents between 56 and 60 (column (f)).
Therefore, the difference in difference is pos-
itive and statistically significant (column (g)),
suggesting that home sellers under the age of 55,
who were previously locked-in, are more likely
to purchase a condominium after TRA97 than
home sellers over the age of 55.
There were several statistically significant
differences in the compositions of the two age
groups before and after TRA97, with home
sellers in both age groups being less white,
having more female-headed households, and
having higher incomes after TRA97 (column
(c) and column (f)). Home sellers over the age
of 55 after TRA97 are more likely to have
earned a bachelor degree. For the explanatory
variables, there is no statistical significance in
column (g), consistent with our assumption that
home sellers between the ages of 56 and 60
are an appropriate comparison group for home
sellers between the ages of 50 and 54. And, of
course, these are differences accounted for in our
estimation.
C. The Empirical Model
All of our models of housing consumption
are designed to control for important determi-
nants of housing demand, while exploiting the
differential treatment of TRA97 on home sellers
under 55 and those over 55 years of age, using
difference-in-difference estimation.
D. Summary of Specifications
As a test of the expected impact of TRA97
on housing consumption, we first estimate a
logit model using a sample of home sellers who
recently moved. Initially, the dependent vari-
able equals 1 if the household lists “moving for
a house less expensive to maintain” as a rea-
son for moving. Explanatory variables including
age, race, gender, marital status, number of chil-
dren, education, and income are included in the
model. Then, the model we estimate is of the
form
P(BuyDown = 1)it = βo + β1TRA97it(2)
+ β2Ait + β3Dit+YearMovedt
+ MSAi + εit
where the subscript i and t denote homeowner
i in year t . TRA97 takes a value of 1 for
those under 55 after 1997 and 0 otherwise
thereby capturing the impact of TRA97. The
term Ait represents an indicator variable, equal
to 1 if the oldest respondent (either the house-
hold head or the household head’s spouse) is
between the ages of 50 and 54. The term
Dit represents a set of additional variables for
the household, which indicate if the household
head is female, white, married, has completed
high school, and whether he or she has a bach-
elor’s degree. Dit also includes the number of
children under the age of 18 in the household
and real family size adjusted income measure in
2004 dollars.8 MSAirepresents a set of dummy
variables for the MSA in which a home seller
resides. An alternative specification replaces the
separate dummy variables for YearMovedt and
MSAi with the interaction of the two terms,
YearMovedt × MSAi.
A similar measure of housing consumption
is based on whether a home seller listed mov-
ing for a larger place as a reason for moving,
which is again estimated with a logit model.
In this case, the coefficient estimate for TRA97
is expected to be negative, as home sellers no
longer have a tax incentive to move to a larger,
more expensive unit.
An analogous logit model is estimated to
examine the impact of TRA97 on the likelihood
of a home seller moving to a condominium.
Again, after 1997, most home sellers can move
8. Family-size adjusted income is real family income
divided by the square-root of household size. This scale is a
version of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) equivalence scales.
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down without a capital gains tax penalty, and the
average price of a condominium is smaller than
that of other housing types, so they are expected
to be more likely to choose a condominium.
Together, these three dependent variables cap-
ture changes in the likelihood that home sellers
move down and are no longer mismatched.
Finally, we need to be clear that, like with
any difference-in-difference framework, there
are possibilities that the identification strategy
might fail. Our identifying assumption is that in
the absence of TRA97 the two age groups fol-
low the same trends in housing consumption. To
the extent that these trends might differ, the con-
fidence in our strategy is reduced. One approach
to reduce these concerns about identification that
we follow is to allow more flexibility in the
model structure, for example including MSA
effects that differ by year to proxy for local eco-
nomic conditions that might differentially affect
those in our two age groups.9
V. RESULTS
For each dependent variable, we report the
results of estimating the model a total of four
times. Our baseline results are made up of recent
home sellers between the ages of 50 and 60.
The baseline is estimated twice, first with MSA
and YearMoved controlled for separately and
second time with MSA–YearMoved interaction
terms. We then provide the results of estimat-
ing our model with the MSA and YearMoved
variables for two different subsamples: a sam-
ple of recent home sellers with family income
above the median, and subsample that only
includes recent home sellers who reside in areas
with above average house price appreciation. We
expect that the housing consumption choices of
respondents under 55 in these subsamples might
be more responsive to TRA97 than other respon-
dents under 55. For those with income above the
median, given the value of their previous home
is likely to be greater, the value of their capital
gain is likely to be greater as well. In addition
they would be subject to a higher tax rate on
any capital gain. The second subsample, those
living in areas of high appreciation are likely to
have larger capital gains as well. In estimating
these subsamples, we follow the approach found
in Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008) as well.
9. We thank an anonymous referee for making this
point and suggesting an approach that reduces the concern.
We have borrowed liberally from his/her comment in this
paragraph.
Table 2 contains coefficient estimates for the
dependent variable “move for a less expensive
house to maintain.”10 Column (a) of Table 2
suggests that recent home sellers who are
affected by TRA97 are 6.2% more likely to
report “moving for a less expensive residence
to maintain” than their counterparts over age
55. Dividing the marginal effect by the sample
mean of 7.4%, we find that this represents an
84% increase in the probability of recent home
sellers choosing this as a reason for moving.
Column (b) illustrates similar results for this
sample when we replace the separate MSA and
YearMoved variables with the interaction of the
two. Although the marginal effect of TRA97,
8.4% is larger in column (b) than in column (a),
the percent change is smaller, suggesting a 76%
increase in the probability of recent home sellers
choosing “a less expensive residence to main-
tain” as a reason for moving.
In column (c) of Table 2, we limit the sample
to households with income above the median.
The effect of TRA97 is more dramatic for
this sample, as recent home sellers affected by
TRA97 are 9.1% more likely to list “moving
for a less expensive residence to maintain” than
those between the ages of 56 and 60. As the
mean for moving to a less expensive house to
maintain is 7.5% for this sample, this is a 121%
increase in the probability of choosing this as a
reason for moving.
Column (d) reports the results of a final
subsample, home sellers residing in areas with
high appreciation, in this case an annual rate
above 3.5%, the sample average. As expected,
the response is greater for recent home sellers
affected by TRA97 in these areas—they are
16.9% more likely than their counterparts over
the age of 55 to list “moving for a less expensive
house to maintain.” This represents a 222%
increase in the likelihood of reporting this as
a reason for moving.
While our focus is on the impact of TRA97,
and therefore the coefficient estimate for
Affected by TRA97, coefficient estimates for
other home seller and household characteristics
are reported in Table 2 as well. Also included,
10. As mentioned earlier, all reported results are from
the estimation of Logit models. As well, we have estimated
the same equations using Probit and linear probability
models. The results for the Probit and linear probability
models are generally very similar in sign and significance.
For the equations reported in Table 2, the coefficient
estimates found in the linear probability model are of smaller
magnitude than the marginal effects from Logit with the
Probit results being very similar.
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TABLE 2
Likelihood of Moving for a Less Expensive House to Maintaina
High HPI
Baselineb High Incomec Appreciationd
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Affected by TRA97 0.834∗∗ 0.836∗∗ 1.221∗ 2.111∗
(2.395) (2.172) (1.898) (1.874)
Marginal effect 0.062 0.084 0.091 0.169
Sample mean 0.074 0.110 0.075 0.076
Percent change 84% 76% 121% 222%
Age 50 to 54 (indicator variable) −0.701∗∗ −0.736∗∗ −1.556∗∗∗ −1.896∗
(2.396) (2.232) (2.751) (1.727)
White 0.145 0.024 0.238 0.279
(0.587) (0.090) (0.495) (0.649)
Female 0.619∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.491
(3.477) (2.830) (3.413) (1.640)
Married −0.134 −0.152 −0.255 −0.200
(0.740) (0.771) (0.825) (0.661)
Number of children −0.079 −0.055 −0.176 −0.021
(0.580) (0.373) (0.635) (0.092)
High school diploma 0.248 0.431 0.890 0.051
(0.844) (1.354) (0.827) (0.101)
Bachelor’s degree −0.080 0.028 −0.529∗ −0.190
(0.422) (0.140) (1.865) (0.609)
Family income/150,000 ($2004) −1.057∗∗ −1.440∗∗∗ −1.147∗ −1.933∗∗
(2.372) (2.689) (1.679) (2.028)
Family income/150,000 squared 0.157 0.274 0.159 0.265
(1.194) (1.445) (1.043) (0.559)
Year moved fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
× year moved dummies No Yes No No
Observations 2,309 1,532 935 818
Log-likelihood value −564 −487 −216 −198
Pseudo R-squared 0.070 0.084 0.132 0.096
aSpecifications are estimated using a logit model. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
bThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60).
cThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60) and have income above the median.
dThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60) and reside in MSAs with above average
HPI appreciation rates.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
but not reported, are dummy variables for Year
Moved and MSA.
The dependent variable in Table 3 is “moving
for a larger place.” In this case, as the depen-
dent variable is a measure of “buying up,” we
expect the coefficient estimate for TRA97 to be
negative. In fact, in all four cases, the reported
coefficient estimate is negative, though only sta-
tistically significant in the first three cases. In
these cases, the percent change in listing “mov-
ing for a larger place” as a reason for moving is
between 62% and 63% lower.
In column (d) of Table 3 the sample only
includes recent home sellers who live in high
house price appreciation areas. While these
home sellers are more likely to move for a
cheaper house to maintain (Table 2), we do not
find statistically significant evidence that they
are less likely to move to a larger home, likely
due to the fact that housing units tend to be
smaller in areas with high house price appreci-
ation. For residents between the ages of 50 and
60, the average dwelling size in an area with
high house price appreciation is 1,844 square
feet compared with 2,946 square feet in an
area with house price appreciation at or below
the median. Therefore, while residents in high
appreciation areas may be mismatched prior to
TRA97, it is less likely that they reside in homes
that are too large.
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TABLE 3
Likelihood of Moving for a Larger Placea
High HPI
Baselineb High Incomec Appreciationd
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Affected by TRA97 −0.831∗∗∗ −0.895∗∗∗ −0.853∗∗ −0.305
(2.789) (2.741) (2.100) (0.526)
Marginal effect −0.066 −0.088 −0.092
Sample mean 0.107 0.143 0.147
Percent change −62% −62% −63%
Age 50 to 54 (indicator variable) 0.896∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.368
(3.584) (3.510) (2.834) (0.672)
White −0.564∗∗∗ −0.612∗∗∗ −0.219 −0.410
(2.865) (2.858) (0.728) (1.298)
Female −0.057 −0.113 0.128 0.200
(0.360) (0.660) (0.650) (0.812)
Married 1.140∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗
(6.075) (5.755) (3.382) (2.961)
Number of children 0.436∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗
(5.470) (5.187) (3.722) (2.883)
High school diploma 0.623∗ 0.792∗∗ 0.701 1.190
(1.924) (2.187) (1.087) (1.422)
Bachelor’s degree 0.200 0.228 0.110 0.460∗
(1.298) (1.345) (0.569) (1.881)
Family income/150,000 ($2004) 0.716∗∗ 0.606 0.223 0.795
(2.207) (1.627) (0.576) (1.569)
Family income/150,000 squared −0.110 −0.077 −0.015 −0.062
(1.090) (0.648) (0.168) (0.402)
Year moved fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
× year moved dummies No Yes No No
Observations 2,381 1,744 1,100 878
Log-likelihood value −699 −602 −413 −268
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.160 0.101 0.155
aSpecifications are estimated using a logit model. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
bThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60).
cThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60) and have income above the median.
dThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60) and reside in MSAs with above average
HPI appreciation rates.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation
of our logit model with the dependent variable
being residing in a condominium. Again, we
associate moving to a condominium as generally
associated with buying down, as the average
price of a condominium is lower than a single-
family house. As well, we view moving to
a condominium as reducing mismatch, as the
average size of a condominium is smaller than
that of other types of housing in the sample.
Home sellers affected by TRA97 are more
likely to move to a condominium, according
to columns (a), (c), and (d), relative to those
over 55. In these columns, TRA97 changes the
sample mean for residing in a condominium
by between 47% and 69%, with the larger
effects from the subsamples expected to be more
affected by TRA97 a priori, those with income
above the median and living in areas with above
average appreciation.
These results suggest that TRA97 had a
greater effect on home sellers slightly under the
age of 55 buying down than it did for those
slightly over this age. This could be viewed as
evidence that TRA97 reduced housing “lock-in”
and mismatch created by pre-TRA97 tax law. In
our sample, following the enactment of TRA97,
home sellers under 55 are more likely to report
moving for a “less expensive house to main-
tain,” and less likely to report moving for “a
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TABLE 4
Likelihood of Moving to a Condominiuma
High HPI
Baselineb High Incomec Appreciationd
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Affected by TRA97 0.567∗ 0.477 0.783∗ 0.919∗
(1.940) (1.481) (1.819) (1.678)
Marginal effect 0.052 0.075 0.101
Sample mean 0.111 0.122 0.146
Percent change 47% 61% 69%
Age 50 to 54 (indicator variable) −0.695∗∗∗ −0.658∗∗ −0.798∗∗ −0.976∗
(2.881) (2.453) (2.256) (1.894)
White 0.367 0.537∗∗ 0.022 0.290
(1.579) (2.121) (0.062) (0.901)
Female 0.307∗∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.477∗∗ 0.392∗
(2.012) (2.110) (2.187) (1.751)
Married −0.860∗∗∗ −0.960∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −1.120∗∗∗
(5.400) (5.538) (4.432) (4.644)
Number of children −0.567∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗ −0.836∗∗∗ −0.468∗
(3.080) (3.308) (2.685) (1.853)
High school diploma 0.978∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗ 0.925 0.440
(2.624) (2.527) (1.095) (0.868)
Bachelor’s degree 0.590∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.407∗
(3.798) (3.427) (2.884) (1.785)
Family income/150,000 ($2004) 0.813∗ 0.938∗∗ 2.898∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗
(1.857) (1.991) (2.993) (2.001)
Family income/150,000 squared −0.319∗ −0.352∗ −1.114∗∗∗ −0.392∗
(1.663) (1.708) (2.618) (1.710)
Year moved fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
× year moved dummies No Yes No No
Observations 2,324 1,656 1,093 863
Log-likelihood value −686 −593 −324 −301
Pseudo R-squared 0.152 0.158 0.199 0.160
aSpecifications are estimated using a logit model. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
bThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60).
cThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60) and have income above the median.
dThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60) and reside in MSAs with above average
HPI appreciation rates.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
larger place,” and, as well, they are more likely
to reside in a condominium, relative to those
over 55.
VI. FALSIFICATION TESTS
In an effort to ensure that recent home
sellers between the ages of 56 and 60 are
a suitable comparison group for recent home
sellers between the ages of 50 and 54, we also
conduct falsification tests for each of our three
dependent variables. We restrict the sample to
recent movers who moved prior to 1997 and
estimate an equation similar to Equation (2),
replacing the TRA97 variable with a false policy
variable. Specifically, we estimate the following
equation
P(BuyDown = 1)it = β0 + β1FALSEit(3)
+ β2Ait + β3Dit + YearMovedt
+ MSAi + εit
The only variable that is different from
Equation (2) is the FALSE variable. The false
policy variable, FALSE, equals 1 if a recent
home seller is between the ages of 50 and 54 and
moved in 1996. If it is the case that over time
home sellers under 55 in our sample are more
likely to move down than their counterparts over
the age of 55, then the results we found in




for a Less Expensive
House to Maintain
Likelihood of





Affected by false policy −2.212∗ −0.326 0.028
(1.879) (0.478) (0.040)
Age 50 to 54 (indicator variable) −0.415 0.960∗∗∗ −0.657∗∗
(1.132) (2.708) (1.965)
White 0.125 −0.716∗ 0.938∗
(0.252) (1.87) (1.722)
Female 0.341 −0.345 0.243
(0.972) (1.042) (0.757)
Married −0.541 1.247∗∗∗ −1.085∗∗∗
(1.499) (3.298) (3.32)
Number of children 0.251 0.476∗∗∗ −0.773∗
(1.006) (2.766) (1.802)
High school diploma 0.089 0.292 1.703∗∗
(0.187) (0.599) (2.198)
Bachelor’s degree −0.084 0.045 0.586∗
(0.215) (0.144) (1.838)
Family income/150,000 −1.754 −1.162 −0.906
(0.75) (0.642) (0.525)
Family income/150,000 squared 0.483 1.949 1.610
(0.185) (1.163) (1.004)
Year moved fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
× year moved dummies No No No
Observations 664 698 641
Log-likelihood value −156 −202 −187
Pseudo R-squared 0.122 0.190 0.193
aSpecifications are estimated using a logit model. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
bThe sample includes recent movers who owned their previous home (age 50–60).
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Section V could be due to differential trends,
rather than TRA97. If that is the case, then the
variable FALSE will have the same effect on
our dependent variables that TRA97 did. Specif-
ically, the FALSE coefficient estimate will be
negative when the dependent variable is “the
likelihood of moving for a less expensive house
to maintain” and “the likelihood of moving to a
condominium.” Analogously, the FALSE coeffi-
cient estimate will be positive when the depen-
dent variable is moving for a larger home.
Table 5 includes the falsification test esti-
mates. Ideally, the FALSE variable would be
insignificant in all three specifications. While
it is not statistically significant in the second
two regressions, “the likelihood of moving to
a larger place” and “the likelihood of mov-
ing to a condominium,” the FALSE variable
is significant at the 10% level in the “likeli-
hood of moving for a less expensive home to
maintain” regression. Although, importantly, it
has a negative coefficient estimate, rather than
the expected positive coefficient estimate found
with the actual measure of TRA97. Therefore,
recent home sellers under the age of 55 in our
sample are less likely to report moving for a
less expensive place to maintain in 1996, rela-
tive to recent home sellers over the age of 55. If
the change we see in 1996 reflects a trend, that
over time fewer and fewer home sellers under
55 report this as a reason for moving, relative
to those over age 55, then the results reported
in Section V are biased downward, and the true
effects of TRA97 are larger than reported.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
TRA97 drastically changed the tax treatment
of capital gains from the sale of a home for those
under the age of 55 by effectively eliminating
the capital gains tax burden for a home seller’s
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primary residence. Since home sellers over 55
were allowed an exemption by previous tax
law, TRA97 differentially affected home sellers
under and over the age of 55. This differential
impact of TRA97 on housing decisions allows
for the use of difference-in-difference estimation
to explore the effects of TRA97 on the housing
consumption decisions of home sellers between
50 and 54 relative to those over 55.
We find evidence that after the enactment of
TRA97 recent home sellers slightly under the
age of 55 are more likely to move down relative
to those slightly over 55. This is evidence of
a lock-in effect created by the pre-TRA97 tax
code, which is consistent with other studies
of the lock-in effects of capital gains taxation
on mobility (Cunningham and Engelhardt 2008;
Shan 2011; Farnham 2006). After the enactment
of TRA97 home sellers slightly under 55 were,
relative to those slight over 55, more likely
to list “a less expensive home to maintain”
as a reason for moving and less likely to list
moving for “larger place” than before TRA97’s
enactment. In addition, the group under 55 saw
a relative increase in the likelihood of living in
a condominium after the enactment of TRA97.
Although the data do not allow us to know with
certainty whether a household moved down,
the evidence we find suggests that TRA97 has
induced homeowners to consume less housing in
the two years following its enactment, reducing
mismatch.
While it is tempting to apply the results
of our analysis to the housing decisions of a
broader sample of those under the age of 55
than our group of homeowners between the ages
of 50 and 54, the extension of these results to
home sellers well-under 55 might be tenuous.
One possible impact of TRA97 on a younger
population of homeowners might, in fact, be
an increase in housing expenditures as these
households would not have to pay capital gains
if they were to desire less expensive housing in
the near future, perhaps as result of moving to
a less expensive housing market or a change in
family structure.
The passage of TRA97 may be expected
to influence other aspects of the housing mar-
ket as well. TRA97 expands the favorable tax
treatment of housing, making it an even bet-
ter investment after 1997. While our analysis
suggests that households slightly under the age
of 55 are spending less on their primary res-
idence than they did previously as suggested
earlier, this might not be the case for those much
younger than 55. Chung (2006) notes that sec-
ond home sales increased drastically between
1997 and 2006, and therefore, it may be that
housing investment has increased, but not in the
primary residence market, though this conjecture
has yet to be explored rigorously.
Finally, we have looked at the impact of
TRA97 on housing consumption and mis-
match. Homeowners who were locked-in to mis-
matched housing prior to 1997 readjusted by
moving, increasing the likelihood that recent
home sellers choose to move for a less expensive
residence to maintain, decreasing the likelihood
of moving for a larger place, and increasing
the likelihood of residing in a condominium.
To the extent that TRA97 reduced mismatch, it
also made the housing market more allocatively
efficient.
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